With strings attached

Statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch

Cole Taratoot, David C. Nixon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter-branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)637-644
Number of pages8
JournalPublic Administration Review
Volume71
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

type of government
government agency
chamber
bureaucracy
statute
Authority
Delegation
president
autonomy
Divided government
examination
Autonomy
Government agencies
Discretion
Specificity
Bureaucracy
Statute

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Cite this

With strings attached : Statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch. / Taratoot, Cole; Nixon, David C.

In: Public Administration Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, 07.2011, p. 637-644.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{91a7ddc2ae864144a023850bd5aa35ab,
title = "With strings attached: Statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch",
abstract = "While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter-branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.",
author = "Cole Taratoot and Nixon, {David C.}",
year = "2011",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02395.x",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "71",
pages = "637--644",
journal = "Public Administration Review",
issn = "0033-3352",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - With strings attached

T2 - Statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch

AU - Taratoot, Cole

AU - Nixon, David C.

PY - 2011/7

Y1 - 2011/7

N2 - While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter-branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.

AB - While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter-branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79959884875&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79959884875&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02395.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02395.x

M3 - Article

VL - 71

SP - 637

EP - 644

JO - Public Administration Review

JF - Public Administration Review

SN - 0033-3352

IS - 4

ER -