Why we should still take it easy

Amie Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In an earlier paper in this journal (2013) I argued that deflationism is preferable to fictionalism as an alternative to both traditional realism and eliminativism.Gabriele Contessa (2016) questions this conclusion, denying that fictionalist arguments beg the question against easy ontological arguments, presenting a new argument against easy ontology, and suggesting a response to the challenge I raise for fictionalists. Below I respond to these points in turn. In so doing, I hope to clarify the broader theoretic orientation of easy ontology-in particular, its rejection of a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment and its commitment to a form of functional pluralism about language.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)769-779
Number of pages11
JournalMind
Volume126
Issue number503
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

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Ontology
Ontological Commitment
Fictionalism
Pluralism
Ontological Argument
Language
Realism
Deflationism
Eliminativism
Rejection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Why we should still take it easy. / Thomasson, Amie.

In: Mind, Vol. 126, No. 503, 01.01.2017, p. 769-779.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Thomasson, A 2017, 'Why we should still take it easy', Mind, vol. 126, no. 503, pp. 769-779. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv212
Thomasson, Amie. / Why we should still take it easy. In: Mind. 2017 ; Vol. 126, No. 503. pp. 769-779.
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