Abstract
This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 5-29 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2005 |
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Keywords
- Financial incentives
- Labor supply
- Social experimentation
- Welfare reform
- Welfare-to-work programs
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
When financial work incentives pay for themselves : Evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients. / Michalopoulos, Charles; Robins, Philip; Card, David.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, No. 1, 01.01.2005, p. 5-29.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - When financial work incentives pay for themselves
T2 - Evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients
AU - Michalopoulos, Charles
AU - Robins, Philip
AU - Card, David
PY - 2005/1/1
Y1 - 2005/1/1
N2 - This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues.
AB - This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues.
KW - Financial incentives
KW - Labor supply
KW - Social experimentation
KW - Welfare reform
KW - Welfare-to-work programs
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=4444330117&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=4444330117&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2002.02.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2002.02.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:4444330117
VL - 89
SP - 5
EP - 29
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
IS - 1
ER -