TY - JOUR
T1 - When financial work incentives pay for themselves
T2 - Evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients
AU - Michalopoulos, Charles
AU - Robins, Philip K.
AU - Card, David
PY - 2005/1/1
Y1 - 2005/1/1
N2 - This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues.
AB - This paper summarizes early findings from a social experiment that provided financial incentives for new welfare recipients to leave welfare and work full time. The financial incentive was essentially a negative income tax with a requirement that people work at least 30 h/week. Early results show that the financial incentive increased full-time employment, earnings, and income, and reduced poverty. Furthermore, at the end of the period discussed in this paper, the program was paying for itself through increased tax revenues.
KW - Financial incentives
KW - Labor supply
KW - Social experimentation
KW - Welfare reform
KW - Welfare-to-work programs
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=4444330117&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=4444330117&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2002.02.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2002.02.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:4444330117
VL - 89
SP - 5
EP - 29
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
IS - 1
ER -