What mary did yesterday: Reflections on knowledge-wh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that "s knows-wh" (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause." Anti-reductionists hold that "s knows-wh" is reducible to "s knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)439-467
Number of pages29
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume78
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2009
Externally publishedYes

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Reductionist
Clause
Indirect Questions
De Re
Car

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

What mary did yesterday : Reflections on knowledge-wh. / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 78, No. 2, 03.2009, p. 439-467.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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