According to the thesis of the extended mind, at least some (token) cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of processes of manipulation, exploitation and transformation performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. In contrast, according to the thesis of the embedded mind, the manipulation, exploitation and transformation of (external) information-bearing structures provides a useful scaffolding which facilitates cognitive processes but does not, even in part, constitute them. The two theses are distinct but often confused. The extended mind has attracted three ostensibly distinct kinds of objection, all of which on further analysis reduce to the idea that the arguments for the extended mind in fact only establish the thesis of the embedded mind. This chapter has two goals. First, it argues that these three objections can all be resolved by the provision of an adequate and properly motivated criterion - or mark - of the cognitive. Second, it provides such a criterion - one made up of four conditions that are sufficient for a process to count as cognitive.