Voluntary disclosure of auditor-provided tax service fees

Jean C. Bedard, Diana Falsetta, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy, Thomas C. Omer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the decisions of firms to voluntarily disclose tax fees paid to their external auditors. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring public companies to disclose fees paid to auditors in 2000, separate disclosure of tax service fees as a component of those fees was not required until 2003. During this period, there was increased scrutiny by the SEC on many aspects of the auditor-client relationship, and by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the sale of tax shelters by large public accounting firms to their clients. Hence, we predict that the decisions of firms that buy tax services from their auditors to voluntarily disclose fees for those services will be significantly influenced by political costs associated with heightened regulatory scrutiny. Results show that the likelihood of separate disclosure of tax fees in 2002 is negatively associated with the ratio of nonaudit service fees (NAS) to total fees, thus supporting the political cost hypothesis. Importantly, we find that the negative association of political cost and disclosure is exacerbated by both audit committee governance and audit firm size. We also find the disclosure decision to be positively associated with agency costs (institutional ownership and size) and negatively associated with the relative amount of deferred taxes, firm profitability, and auditor change. In summary, these results shed light on the roles played by two important players in the corporate governance structure of a firm (the audit committee and the audit firm) in determining a firm's voluntary disclosure practices.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)59-77
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of the American Taxation Association
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2010

Fingerprint

Tax
Fees
Auditors
Voluntary disclosure
Disclosure
Political costs
Audit firms
Securities and Exchange Commission
Audit committee
Corporate governance
Firm size
External auditor
Governance
Tax shelters
Deferred taxes
Revenue
Public accounting firms
Agency costs
Firm profitability
Auditor change

Keywords

  • Nonaudit services
  • Political costs
  • Tax consulting
  • Voluntary disclosure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Accounting

Cite this

Voluntary disclosure of auditor-provided tax service fees. / Bedard, Jean C.; Falsetta, Diana; Krishnamoorthy, Ganesh; Omer, Thomas C.

In: Journal of the American Taxation Association, Vol. 32, No. 1, 02.2010, p. 59-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bedard, Jean C. ; Falsetta, Diana ; Krishnamoorthy, Ganesh ; Omer, Thomas C. / Voluntary disclosure of auditor-provided tax service fees. In: Journal of the American Taxation Association. 2010 ; Vol. 32, No. 1. pp. 59-77.
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