Unequal Information, Unequal Allocation: Bargaining field experiments in NE Brazil

Alexander Pfaff, Maria Alejandra Velez, Renzo Taddei, Kenneth Broad

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We assess how unequal information affects the bargaining within resource allocation, a stakeholder interaction that is critical for climate adaptation within the water sector. Motivated by water allocation among unequal actors in NE Brazil, within Ceará State, we employ 'ultimatum' field experiments in which one participant lacks information. We find that, despite having veto power, the less informed are vulnerable to inequity. When all are informed, we see a typical resource split (60% initiator-40% responder) that balances an initiator's advantage with a responder's willingness to punish greed. When instead responders have only a resource forecast upon which to base decisions, the fully informed initiators get 80% of resources for conditions of resource scarcity. Thus, despite each of the stakeholder types having an unquestioned 'seat at the table', information asymmetries make bargaining outcomes more unequal. Our results are widely relevant for adaptation involving the joint use of information, and suggest that equity can rise with dissemination of scientific outputs that are integral in adaptation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)90-101
Number of pages12
JournalEnvironmental Science and Policy
Volume26
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2013

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bargaining
Brazil
experiment
resources
stakeholder
resource
scarcity of resources
resource scarcity
water
resource allocation
asymmetry
equity
climate
allocation
field experiment
lack
interaction

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Climate
  • Equity
  • Field experiments
  • Uncertainty
  • Water

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Geography, Planning and Development

Cite this

Unequal Information, Unequal Allocation : Bargaining field experiments in NE Brazil. / Pfaff, Alexander; Velez, Maria Alejandra; Taddei, Renzo; Broad, Kenneth.

In: Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 26, 02.2013, p. 90-101.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Pfaff, Alexander ; Velez, Maria Alejandra ; Taddei, Renzo ; Broad, Kenneth. / Unequal Information, Unequal Allocation : Bargaining field experiments in NE Brazil. In: Environmental Science and Policy. 2013 ; Vol. 26. pp. 90-101.
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