Abstract
We assess how unequal information affects the bargaining within resource allocation, a stakeholder interaction that is critical for climate adaptation within the water sector. Motivated by water allocation among unequal actors in NE Brazil, within Ceará State, we employ 'ultimatum' field experiments in which one participant lacks information. We find that, despite having veto power, the less informed are vulnerable to inequity. When all are informed, we see a typical resource split (60% initiator-40% responder) that balances an initiator's advantage with a responder's willingness to punish greed. When instead responders have only a resource forecast upon which to base decisions, the fully informed initiators get 80% of resources for conditions of resource scarcity. Thus, despite each of the stakeholder types having an unquestioned 'seat at the table', information asymmetries make bargaining outcomes more unequal. Our results are widely relevant for adaptation involving the joint use of information, and suggest that equity can rise with dissemination of scientific outputs that are integral in adaptation.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 90-101 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Environmental Science and Policy |
| Volume | 26 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2013 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Asymmetric information
- Climate
- Equity
- Field experiments
- Uncertainty
- Water
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Geography, Planning and Development
Cite this
Unequal Information, Unequal Allocation : Bargaining field experiments in NE Brazil. / Pfaff, Alexander; Velez, Maria Alejandra; Taddei, Renzo; Broad, Kenneth.
In: Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 26, 02.2013, p. 90-101.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Unequal Information, Unequal Allocation
T2 - Bargaining field experiments in NE Brazil
AU - Pfaff, Alexander
AU - Velez, Maria Alejandra
AU - Taddei, Renzo
AU - Broad, Kenneth
PY - 2013/2
Y1 - 2013/2
N2 - We assess how unequal information affects the bargaining within resource allocation, a stakeholder interaction that is critical for climate adaptation within the water sector. Motivated by water allocation among unequal actors in NE Brazil, within Ceará State, we employ 'ultimatum' field experiments in which one participant lacks information. We find that, despite having veto power, the less informed are vulnerable to inequity. When all are informed, we see a typical resource split (60% initiator-40% responder) that balances an initiator's advantage with a responder's willingness to punish greed. When instead responders have only a resource forecast upon which to base decisions, the fully informed initiators get 80% of resources for conditions of resource scarcity. Thus, despite each of the stakeholder types having an unquestioned 'seat at the table', information asymmetries make bargaining outcomes more unequal. Our results are widely relevant for adaptation involving the joint use of information, and suggest that equity can rise with dissemination of scientific outputs that are integral in adaptation.
AB - We assess how unequal information affects the bargaining within resource allocation, a stakeholder interaction that is critical for climate adaptation within the water sector. Motivated by water allocation among unequal actors in NE Brazil, within Ceará State, we employ 'ultimatum' field experiments in which one participant lacks information. We find that, despite having veto power, the less informed are vulnerable to inequity. When all are informed, we see a typical resource split (60% initiator-40% responder) that balances an initiator's advantage with a responder's willingness to punish greed. When instead responders have only a resource forecast upon which to base decisions, the fully informed initiators get 80% of resources for conditions of resource scarcity. Thus, despite each of the stakeholder types having an unquestioned 'seat at the table', information asymmetries make bargaining outcomes more unequal. Our results are widely relevant for adaptation involving the joint use of information, and suggest that equity can rise with dissemination of scientific outputs that are integral in adaptation.
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Climate
KW - Equity
KW - Field experiments
KW - Uncertainty
KW - Water
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84871712013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84871712013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.envsci.2012.07.002
DO - 10.1016/j.envsci.2012.07.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84871712013
VL - 26
SP - 90
EP - 101
JO - Environmental Science and Policy
JF - Environmental Science and Policy
SN - 1462-9011
ER -