Understanding and semantic strucure

Reply to Timothy Williamson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In his essay '"Conceptual Truth"', Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson's argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider the role that the structure of a sentence plays in determining its meaning. The cases I present suggest that this role imposes greater cognitive requirements on understanding than Williamson can acknowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)337-343
Number of pages7
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society
Volume109
Issue number1 PART 3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2009
Externally publishedYes

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Timothy Williamson

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Understanding and semantic strucure : Reply to Timothy Williamson. / Balcerak Jackson, Brendan.

In: Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol. 109, No. 1 PART 3, 10.2009, p. 337-343.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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