Two puzzles for a new theory of consciousness

Amie L. Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


In The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert proposes a novel understanding of consciousness by arguing against higher-order views of consciousness and rejecting the traditional taxonomy of the mental into qualitative and intentional aspects. I discuss two puzzles that arise from these changes: first, how to account for first-person knowledge of our conscious states while denying that these are typically accompanied by higher-order states directed towards them; second, how to understand his claim that phenomenal features are intentional features without either risking consciousness neglect or retreating to a more traditional understanding of the relation between qualitative and intentional character.

Original languageEnglish (US)
StatePublished - Feb 1 2002


  • Consciousness
  • First-person knowledge
  • Higher-order representation
  • Intentionality
  • Phenomenal character
  • Qualia

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Philosophy
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Artificial Intelligence


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