Trial and error

The Supreme Court's philosophy of science

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Apparently equating the question of whether expert testimony is reliable with the question of whether it is genuinely scientific, in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993) the US Supreme Court ran together Karl Popper's and Carl Hempel's incompatible philosophies of science. But there can be no criterion discriminating scientific, and hence reliable, testimony from the unscientific and unreliable; for not all, and not only, scientific evidence is reliable. In subsequent rulings (General Electric Co v Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 1999) the Court has backed quietly away from Daubert's confused philosophy of science, but not from federal judges' responsibilities for screening expert testimony. Efforts to educate judges scientifically, and increased use of court-appointed experts are, at best, only partial solutions to the problems with scientific testimony.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalAmerican Journal of Public Health
Volume95
Issue numberSUPPL. 1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005

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Expert Testimony
Pharmaceutical Preparations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

Cite this

Trial and error : The Supreme Court's philosophy of science. / Haack, Susan.

In: American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 95, No. SUPPL. 1, 2005.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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