Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

4 Scopus citations


This chapter is about the science of vision and memory in relation to virtue epistemology. My argument will turn on the point that the mechanisms underlying vision and knowledge that, according to current neuroscience, remain non-conscious can’t be considered virtuous mechanisms even if they are highly reliable. Hence, I argue, virtue epistemology cannot count these obvious forms of knowledge as true forms of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus is at best a partial theory of knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSynthese Library
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages20
StatePublished - 2014

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
ISSN (Print)0166-6991
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8292


  • Cognitive Faculty
  • Dorsal Stream
  • Epistemic Norm
  • False Memory
  • True Belief

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • History
  • Language and Linguistics
  • Logic


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