### Abstract

This paper proposes a novel framework for incentivizing self-interested transceivers operating in autonomic wireless networks to provide relaying services to other transceivers in exchange for tokens. Tokens represent a simple internal currency which can be used by the transceivers in a network to exchange services. Our emphasis in this paper is on developing optimal designs for the token system, which maximize the system efficiency, i.e. The probability that the relay transmission will be executed by transceivers whenever they are requested to provide such services. Particularly, we prove that the efficiency of the relay network heavily depends on issuing the proper amount of tokens rather than an arbitrary amount. First, we study the transceivers' optimal strategies (i.e. The strategies that maximize the transceivers' own utilities) using the formalism of repeated games. We prove that these strategies exhibit a simple threshold structure. We also prove that the threshold is unique given transmission costs. Second, we determine the optimal token amount which needs to be introduced in the relay system to maximize the overall relay network efficiency. This amount needs to be neither too small (since a too small amount leads to a small relaying service request probability) nor too large (since a too large amount leads to a small relaying service provision probability) and depends on the threshold strategy that the self-interested transceivers adopt. We subsequently develop an efficient algorithm which is able to determine, depending on the network characteristics, the threshold to be implemented by the optimal strategies and the optimal token amount. Finally, simulation results show the effectiveness of our token system design in providing incentives for cooperation among self-interested relays in autonomic wireless relay networks.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Article number | 6544193 |

Pages (from-to) | 2924-2935 |

Number of pages | 12 |

Journal | IEEE Transactions on Communications |

Volume | 61 |

Issue number | 7 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - 2013 |

Externally published | Yes |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Autonomic communication
- Cooperative communication
- Incentives
- Repeated games
- Tokens
- Wireless relay networks

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Electrical and Electronic Engineering

### Cite this

*IEEE Transactions on Communications*,

*61*(7), 2924-2935. [6544193]. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCOMM.2013.061013.120777

**Token system design for autonomic wireless relay networks.** / Xu, Jie; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*IEEE Transactions on Communications*, vol. 61, no. 7, 6544193, pp. 2924-2935. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCOMM.2013.061013.120777

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Token system design for autonomic wireless relay networks

AU - Xu, Jie

AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper proposes a novel framework for incentivizing self-interested transceivers operating in autonomic wireless networks to provide relaying services to other transceivers in exchange for tokens. Tokens represent a simple internal currency which can be used by the transceivers in a network to exchange services. Our emphasis in this paper is on developing optimal designs for the token system, which maximize the system efficiency, i.e. The probability that the relay transmission will be executed by transceivers whenever they are requested to provide such services. Particularly, we prove that the efficiency of the relay network heavily depends on issuing the proper amount of tokens rather than an arbitrary amount. First, we study the transceivers' optimal strategies (i.e. The strategies that maximize the transceivers' own utilities) using the formalism of repeated games. We prove that these strategies exhibit a simple threshold structure. We also prove that the threshold is unique given transmission costs. Second, we determine the optimal token amount which needs to be introduced in the relay system to maximize the overall relay network efficiency. This amount needs to be neither too small (since a too small amount leads to a small relaying service request probability) nor too large (since a too large amount leads to a small relaying service provision probability) and depends on the threshold strategy that the self-interested transceivers adopt. We subsequently develop an efficient algorithm which is able to determine, depending on the network characteristics, the threshold to be implemented by the optimal strategies and the optimal token amount. Finally, simulation results show the effectiveness of our token system design in providing incentives for cooperation among self-interested relays in autonomic wireless relay networks.

AB - This paper proposes a novel framework for incentivizing self-interested transceivers operating in autonomic wireless networks to provide relaying services to other transceivers in exchange for tokens. Tokens represent a simple internal currency which can be used by the transceivers in a network to exchange services. Our emphasis in this paper is on developing optimal designs for the token system, which maximize the system efficiency, i.e. The probability that the relay transmission will be executed by transceivers whenever they are requested to provide such services. Particularly, we prove that the efficiency of the relay network heavily depends on issuing the proper amount of tokens rather than an arbitrary amount. First, we study the transceivers' optimal strategies (i.e. The strategies that maximize the transceivers' own utilities) using the formalism of repeated games. We prove that these strategies exhibit a simple threshold structure. We also prove that the threshold is unique given transmission costs. Second, we determine the optimal token amount which needs to be introduced in the relay system to maximize the overall relay network efficiency. This amount needs to be neither too small (since a too small amount leads to a small relaying service request probability) nor too large (since a too large amount leads to a small relaying service provision probability) and depends on the threshold strategy that the self-interested transceivers adopt. We subsequently develop an efficient algorithm which is able to determine, depending on the network characteristics, the threshold to be implemented by the optimal strategies and the optimal token amount. Finally, simulation results show the effectiveness of our token system design in providing incentives for cooperation among self-interested relays in autonomic wireless relay networks.

KW - Autonomic communication

KW - Cooperative communication

KW - Incentives

KW - Repeated games

KW - Tokens

KW - Wireless relay networks

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881125853&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84881125853&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/TCOMM.2013.061013.120777

DO - 10.1109/TCOMM.2013.061013.120777

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84881125853

VL - 61

SP - 2924

EP - 2935

JO - IEEE Transactions on Communications

JF - IEEE Transactions on Communications

SN - 0096-1965

IS - 7

M1 - 6544193

ER -