The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, colour expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. The argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism may be called the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. In this chapter the argument is formulated and three possible ways to refute it are examined. It is then argued that two of these are unsuccessful and the third, which involves denying that there are genuinely relative truths, is defended.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEpistemic Value
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191710827, 9780199231188
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2009
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Epistemic Values
Value Pluralism
Relativism
Future Contingents
Monism
Merit
Epistemic Modals
Intuition
Personal Taste

Keywords

  • Contextualism
  • Epistemic goal
  • Epistemic value
  • Epistemic value pluralism
  • Personal taste
  • Relativism
  • Trivial arguement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth. / Brogaard, Berit.

Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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