The remembered

Understanding the content of episodic memory

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

According to what I shall call the thesis of the presence of self in memory, to be defended in this chapter, a memory can qualify as episodic only if it presents an episode as one the subject formerly encountered. This thesis requires us to revise our conception of the content of episodic memory. The way in which an episode is presented is essential to the content of episodic memory. This has two important implications: First, the content of episodic memory is not independent of the act of remembering. Second, any particular case of episodic remembering must be sufficiently reconstructive for the episode to be recognized as one that the subject formerly encountered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNew Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages279-293
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781351660020
ISBN (Print)9781138065604
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Episodic Memory
Remembering
Conception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Rowlands, M. (2018). The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (pp. 279-293). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591

The remembered : Understanding the content of episodic memory. / Rowlands, Mark.

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Taylor and Francis, 2018. p. 279-293.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Rowlands, M 2018, The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory. in New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Taylor and Francis, pp. 279-293. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591
Rowlands M. The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Taylor and Francis. 2018. p. 279-293 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591
Rowlands, Mark. / The remembered : Understanding the content of episodic memory. New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Taylor and Francis, 2018. pp. 279-293
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