The nature of intuitive justification

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

59 Scopus citations


In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology-and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)313-333
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 28 2011


  • Dogmatism
  • Epistemology
  • Intuition
  • Justification
  • Phenomenology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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