The minority game with different payoff functions: Crowd-anticrowd theory

Kuen Lee, P. M. Hui, Neil F Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The crowd-anticrowd theory is applied to explain the features observed in a class of the minority game using different payoff functions. Simulations results using both the full strategy space and a reduced strategy space reveal that the standard deviation (SD) in the number of agents making a particular decision over time as a function of the agents' memory size m does not depend on the explicit form of the payoff function. The robustness of the results is explained in terms of the general features in strategy selection among the agents in different regimes of m. While different payoff functions may affect the popularity of a particular strategy, the strategy selection is found to be insensitive to the choice of payoff functions. The crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect leads to a minimum in SD at an intermediate value of m separating the small m regime characterized by crowd behavior and the large m regime characterized by random coin-toss behavior of the agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)309-317
Number of pages9
JournalPhysica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
Volume321
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Minority Game
games
minorities
Standard deviation
standard deviation
Cancellation
cancellation
Strategy
Robustness
Simulation
simulation

Keywords

  • Agent-based models
  • Complex adaptive systems
  • Econophysics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematical Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

Cite this

The minority game with different payoff functions : Crowd-anticrowd theory. / Lee, Kuen; Hui, P. M.; Johnson, Neil F.

In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 321, No. 1-2, 01.04.2003, p. 309-317.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lee, Kuen ; Hui, P. M. ; Johnson, Neil F. / The minority game with different payoff functions : Crowd-anticrowd theory. In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2003 ; Vol. 321, No. 1-2. pp. 309-317.
@article{bf72df552f084ff6afac43618400503f,
title = "The minority game with different payoff functions: Crowd-anticrowd theory",
abstract = "The crowd-anticrowd theory is applied to explain the features observed in a class of the minority game using different payoff functions. Simulations results using both the full strategy space and a reduced strategy space reveal that the standard deviation (SD) in the number of agents making a particular decision over time as a function of the agents' memory size m does not depend on the explicit form of the payoff function. The robustness of the results is explained in terms of the general features in strategy selection among the agents in different regimes of m. While different payoff functions may affect the popularity of a particular strategy, the strategy selection is found to be insensitive to the choice of payoff functions. The crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect leads to a minimum in SD at an intermediate value of m separating the small m regime characterized by crowd behavior and the large m regime characterized by random coin-toss behavior of the agents.",
keywords = "Agent-based models, Complex adaptive systems, Econophysics",
author = "Kuen Lee and Hui, {P. M.} and Johnson, {Neil F}",
year = "2003",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01786-7",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "321",
pages = "309--317",
journal = "Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications",
issn = "0378-4371",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1-2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The minority game with different payoff functions

T2 - Crowd-anticrowd theory

AU - Lee, Kuen

AU - Hui, P. M.

AU - Johnson, Neil F

PY - 2003/4/1

Y1 - 2003/4/1

N2 - The crowd-anticrowd theory is applied to explain the features observed in a class of the minority game using different payoff functions. Simulations results using both the full strategy space and a reduced strategy space reveal that the standard deviation (SD) in the number of agents making a particular decision over time as a function of the agents' memory size m does not depend on the explicit form of the payoff function. The robustness of the results is explained in terms of the general features in strategy selection among the agents in different regimes of m. While different payoff functions may affect the popularity of a particular strategy, the strategy selection is found to be insensitive to the choice of payoff functions. The crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect leads to a minimum in SD at an intermediate value of m separating the small m regime characterized by crowd behavior and the large m regime characterized by random coin-toss behavior of the agents.

AB - The crowd-anticrowd theory is applied to explain the features observed in a class of the minority game using different payoff functions. Simulations results using both the full strategy space and a reduced strategy space reveal that the standard deviation (SD) in the number of agents making a particular decision over time as a function of the agents' memory size m does not depend on the explicit form of the payoff function. The robustness of the results is explained in terms of the general features in strategy selection among the agents in different regimes of m. While different payoff functions may affect the popularity of a particular strategy, the strategy selection is found to be insensitive to the choice of payoff functions. The crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect leads to a minimum in SD at an intermediate value of m separating the small m regime characterized by crowd behavior and the large m regime characterized by random coin-toss behavior of the agents.

KW - Agent-based models

KW - Complex adaptive systems

KW - Econophysics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037381216&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0037381216&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01786-7

DO - 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01786-7

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0037381216

VL - 321

SP - 309

EP - 317

JO - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

JF - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

SN - 0378-4371

IS - 1-2

ER -