The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement

Otávio Bueno, Yukinori Onishi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

What sort of evidence can confer the strongest support to a hypothesis? A natural answer is that the evidence entails the hypothesis. Roush (Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005) claims that the likelihood ratio measure of degree of incremental support can deliver this intuitively natural result, and regards it as unifying “[the] account of induction and deduction in the only way that makes sense” (p. 163). In this paper, we highlight a difficulty in the treatment of this case, and question the great significance that is attached to this measure and its alleged capacity to accommodate the logicality requirement. We contrast the likelihood ratio measure with other measures (such as the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure and the difference measure), and argue that problems still emerge in light of tensions with plausible requirements for confirmation measures more generally.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalErkenntnis
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

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