Abstract
The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. "backdating") captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2-26 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting and Economics |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2009 |
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Keywords
- Agency costs
- Corporate scandal
- Event-study
- Option backdating
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders. / Bernile, Gennaro; Jarrell, Gregg A.
In: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1-2, 01.03.2009, p. 2-26.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders
AU - Bernile, Gennaro
AU - Jarrell, Gregg A.
PY - 2009/3/1
Y1 - 2009/3/1
N2 - The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. "backdating") captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.
AB - The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. "backdating") captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.
KW - Agency costs
KW - Corporate scandal
KW - Event-study
KW - Option backdating
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=59749106378&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=59749106378&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:59749106378
VL - 47
SP - 2
EP - 26
JO - Journal of Accounting and Economics
JF - Journal of Accounting and Economics
SN - 0165-4101
IS - 1-2
ER -