The epistemic unity of perception

Elijah Chudnoff, David DiDomenico

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)535-549
Number of pages15
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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