The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations

Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Martin Larraza-Kintana, Marianna Makri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

419 Scopus citations

Abstract

Family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be more insulated from risk and more sensitive to systematic (less controllable) business risk. The presence of institutional investors and R&D intensity play important moderating roles in these relationships.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)226-237
Number of pages12
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume46
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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