Teleological semantics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Teleological theories of content are thought to suffer from two related difficulties. According to the problem of indeterminacy, biological function is indeterminate in the sense that, in the case of two competing interpretations of the function of an evolved mechanism, there is often no fact of the matter capable of determining which function is the correct one. Therefore, any attempts to construct content out of biological function entail the indeterminacy of content. According to the problem of transparency, statements of biological function are transparent in that a statement of the form 'the function of evolved mechanism M is to represent Fs' can be substituted salva veritate by a statement of the form 'the function of evolved mechanism M is to represent Gs' provided that the statement 'F iff G' is counterfactual supporting. Therefore, any attempt to construct content out of biological function must fail to capture the intensionality of psychological ascriptions. This paper argues that the teleological account is undermined by neither of these problems. Failure to appreciate this point stems from a conflation of two types of proper function - organismic and algorithmic - possessed by an evolved mechanism. These functions underwrite attributions of content to distinct objects. The algorithmic proper function of a mechanism underwrites attributions of content to the mechanism itself, while the organismic proper function of a mechanism underwrites attribution of content to the organism that possesses the mechanism. However the problems of indeterminacy and transparency arise only if the attributions of content attach to the same object.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)279-304
Number of pages26
JournalMind
Volume106
Issue number422
StatePublished - 1997
Externally publishedYes

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Biological Function
Attribution
Proper Function
Indeterminacy
Transparency
Intensionality
Indeterminate
Conflation
Psychological
Organism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Rowlands, M. (1997). Teleological semantics. Mind, 106(422), 279-304.

Teleological semantics. / Rowlands, Mark.

In: Mind, Vol. 106, No. 422, 1997, p. 279-304.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rowlands, M 1997, 'Teleological semantics', Mind, vol. 106, no. 422, pp. 279-304.
Rowlands M. Teleological semantics. Mind. 1997;106(422):279-304.
Rowlands, Mark. / Teleological semantics. In: Mind. 1997 ; Vol. 106, No. 422. pp. 279-304.
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