Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information

Jie Xu, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we build a rating system that shapes the incentives of selfish users in such a way that they find it in their self-interest to cooperate with each other in social exchange networks. A rating system consists of a policy, which provides differential service for users with different ratings and a rating update rule, which rewards or penalizes users depending on whether they cooperate or not when they are asked to provide service. A key novelty of this paper is that we consider social exchange networks where users interact based on only incomplete global information about the rating distribution of the users participating in the network. We rigorously formalize the design problem of the optimal rating system which needs to be solved by the network designer as a coupled two-level optimization: users' incentive problem and the efficiency maximization problem. We study the system dynamics of the social rating when users only have incomplete information. We prove that the users' optimal decision problems exhibit threshold properties and hence, users need to have sufficient 'trust' in the other network users to decide to cooperate. We also show how the optimal design depends on specific environment parameters (e.g. The benefit and cost of providing service in these networks) and which of these rating systems are sustainable when users are self-interested.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Pages50-55
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012 - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2012Dec 13 2012

Other

Other51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012
CountryUnited States
CityMaui, HI
Period12/10/1212/13/12

Fingerprint

Dynamical systems
Costs
Incentives
Incomplete Information
Reward
Decision problem
System Dynamics
Optimal design
Update
Sufficient
Optimization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Xu, J., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2012). Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (pp. 50-55). [6426250] https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250

Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information. / Xu, Jie; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. p. 50-55 6426250.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Xu, J & Van Der Schaar, M 2012, Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information. in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control., 6426250, pp. 50-55, 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012, Maui, HI, United States, 12/10/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250
Xu J, Van Der Schaar M. Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. p. 50-55. 6426250 https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250
Xu, Jie ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012. pp. 50-55
@inproceedings{9bc197492760455fa273a52c63bdd4aa,
title = "Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information",
abstract = "In this paper, we build a rating system that shapes the incentives of selfish users in such a way that they find it in their self-interest to cooperate with each other in social exchange networks. A rating system consists of a policy, which provides differential service for users with different ratings and a rating update rule, which rewards or penalizes users depending on whether they cooperate or not when they are asked to provide service. A key novelty of this paper is that we consider social exchange networks where users interact based on only incomplete global information about the rating distribution of the users participating in the network. We rigorously formalize the design problem of the optimal rating system which needs to be solved by the network designer as a coupled two-level optimization: users' incentive problem and the efficiency maximization problem. We study the system dynamics of the social rating when users only have incomplete information. We prove that the users' optimal decision problems exhibit threshold properties and hence, users need to have sufficient 'trust' in the other network users to decide to cooperate. We also show how the optimal design depends on specific environment parameters (e.g. The benefit and cost of providing service in these networks) and which of these rating systems are sustainable when users are self-interested.",
author = "Jie Xu and {Van Der Schaar}, Mihaela",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "50--55",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Sustaining cooperation in social exchange networks with incomplete global information

AU - Xu, Jie

AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - In this paper, we build a rating system that shapes the incentives of selfish users in such a way that they find it in their self-interest to cooperate with each other in social exchange networks. A rating system consists of a policy, which provides differential service for users with different ratings and a rating update rule, which rewards or penalizes users depending on whether they cooperate or not when they are asked to provide service. A key novelty of this paper is that we consider social exchange networks where users interact based on only incomplete global information about the rating distribution of the users participating in the network. We rigorously formalize the design problem of the optimal rating system which needs to be solved by the network designer as a coupled two-level optimization: users' incentive problem and the efficiency maximization problem. We study the system dynamics of the social rating when users only have incomplete information. We prove that the users' optimal decision problems exhibit threshold properties and hence, users need to have sufficient 'trust' in the other network users to decide to cooperate. We also show how the optimal design depends on specific environment parameters (e.g. The benefit and cost of providing service in these networks) and which of these rating systems are sustainable when users are self-interested.

AB - In this paper, we build a rating system that shapes the incentives of selfish users in such a way that they find it in their self-interest to cooperate with each other in social exchange networks. A rating system consists of a policy, which provides differential service for users with different ratings and a rating update rule, which rewards or penalizes users depending on whether they cooperate or not when they are asked to provide service. A key novelty of this paper is that we consider social exchange networks where users interact based on only incomplete global information about the rating distribution of the users participating in the network. We rigorously formalize the design problem of the optimal rating system which needs to be solved by the network designer as a coupled two-level optimization: users' incentive problem and the efficiency maximization problem. We study the system dynamics of the social rating when users only have incomplete information. We prove that the users' optimal decision problems exhibit threshold properties and hence, users need to have sufficient 'trust' in the other network users to decide to cooperate. We also show how the optimal design depends on specific environment parameters (e.g. The benefit and cost of providing service in these networks) and which of these rating systems are sustainable when users are self-interested.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84874223738&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84874223738&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250

DO - 10.1109/CDC.2012.6426250

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 50

EP - 55

BT - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

ER -