Supplier diversification strategies in the presence of yield uncertainty and buyer competition

Sammi Tang, Panos Kouvelis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

59 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The benefits of supplier diversification are well established for price-taking firms. In this paper, we investigate the benefits from supplier diversification for dual-sourcing duopolists. We consider a two-echelon supply chain in which suppliers sell components to buyers who produce and sell substitutable products. The suppliers' output processes are uncertain and modeled as having a proportional random yield. Buyers engage in a quantity-based Cournot competition. We find that an increase in supplier correlation leads to more correlated buyers' outputs and a decrease in their profits. In the presence of end-market competition, dual sourcing still brings value by reducing the inefficiency caused by random yield: Namely, when the suppliers' yield processes are strongly negatively correlated, dual sourcing increases the expected market output and improves the firms' profits over sole sourcing. However, unlike a monopolist firm, a duopolist does not necessarily allocate its supplier orders to minimize output variability. We generalize the main results to a two-stage order-quantity-output-quantity game and to one with asymmetric suppliers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)439-451
Number of pages13
JournalManufacturing and Service Operations Management
Volume13
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2011

Fingerprint

Suppliers
Buyers
Diversification strategy
Uncertainty
Dual sourcing
Diversification
Profit
Random yield
Supply chain
Monopolist
Inefficiency
Market competition
Sourcing
Order quantity
Price-taking
Cournot competition

Keywords

  • Cournot competition
  • Dual sourcing
  • Equilibrium
  • Random yield
  • Supply uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Supplier diversification strategies in the presence of yield uncertainty and buyer competition. / Tang, Sammi; Kouvelis, Panos.

In: Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Vol. 13, No. 4, 01.09.2011, p. 439-451.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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