Abstract
Knobe argues that people's judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. I tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe's but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. My results show that it is people's sense of what agents deserve, and not the moral status of side-effects, that drives intuition.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 332-334 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs |
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State | Published - Aug 1 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
- Physiology
- Behavioral Neuroscience