Structural Empiricism, Again

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

As is well known, there are two crucial arguments in the realism debate. According to the no-miracles argument, it would be a miracle if our best scientific theories – namely, those which successfully predict novel phenomena – were not true (or approximately true). So, we should take theories that yield novel predictions as being true or, at least, approximately so. Clearly, considerations of this sort are raised to support realism. On the other hand, according to the pessimist meta-induction, many of our best-confirmed theories have turned out to be false. So, how can we guarantee that current theories are true? Considerations such as these, in turn, are meant to provide support for anti-realism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages81-103
Number of pages23
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011

Publication series

NameBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Volume281
ISSN (Print)0068-0346
ISSN (Electronic)2214-7942

Keywords

  • Hilbert Space
  • Mathematical Object
  • Quantum Mechanic
  • Quantum Particle
  • Structural Realist

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • Literature and Literary Theory
  • Anthropology
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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