Stability of Functional Rational Expectations Equilibria

David L. Kelly, Jamsheed Shorish

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first-order self-referential overlapping generations model. We first consider intermediate stage learning, where agents update the forecasting rule every m periods. We show that, in theory and simulations, the learning rule does not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). We next consider two stage learning, where agents learn the functional mapping between the current forecast function and the previous forecast function. We show that in theory and simulations the two stage learning rule converges to the REE. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C62, C63, D83.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)215-250
Number of pages36
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume95
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2000

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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