Sosa on skepticism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our perceptual beliefs will be apt. Hence, in these conditions, we will have at least animal knowledge, and the conclusion of the dream argument is undermined. In this article, I examine various moves that the skeptic can make to resist Sosa's challenge, and I contrast the proposal to a neo-Pyrrhonian stance. In the end, there is surprisingly little disagreement about the status of ordinary perceptual beliefs in the two stances.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)195-202
Number of pages8
JournalMetaphilosophy
Volume40
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009

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Skepticism
Stance
Dreaming
Virtue Epistemology
Animal Knowledge
Ernest Sosa
Skeptics

Keywords

  • Dream argument
  • Ernest Sosa
  • Pyrrhonism
  • Skepticism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Sosa on skepticism. / Bueno, Otavio.

In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2009, p. 195-202.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bueno, Otavio. / Sosa on skepticism. In: Metaphilosophy. 2009 ; Vol. 40, No. 2. pp. 195-202.
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