Sentimentalist virtue epistemology: Beyond responsibilism and reliabilism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have been reviving recently, but the revival has taken them in somewhat different directions. There are currently two main competing branches of virtue ethics: the neo-Aristotelian and the sentimentalist or neo-Humean. This chapter shows how a foundationally sentimentalist virtue epistemology can pinpoint epistemic person-level character traits that can justify not only perceptual, but also memory, inductive, and abductive beliefs. Responsibilism holds that individuals are responsible for whether they are epistemically virtuous: e.g., whether they are, or are not, intellectually courageous or open-minded. A genuinely open-minded person doesn’t have to be receptive to every viewpoint: it can be appropriate for them to reject certain crazy beliefs out of hand. So it turns out that the Personalist approach advocated enriches the possibilities for virtue epistemology by taking it in a sentimentalist direction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages105-114
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781317495291
ISBN (Print)9781138890206
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 4 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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