Sensorimotor activity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the concept of sensorimotor activity that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë's book, Action in Perception, The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of representational states, and is therefore also unable to aid us in the project of understanding representation. The solution, I argue, lies in a new conception of sensorimotor activity, according to which such activity is normative, but where this normativity is not inherited from prior representational states.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-10
Number of pages10
JournalPsyche
Volume12
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Visual Perception
Sensorimotor

Keywords

  • Action
  • Knowing-how
  • Knowing-that
  • Normativity
  • Representation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

Rowlands, M. (2006). Sensorimotor activity. Psyche, 12(1), 1-10.

Sensorimotor activity. / Rowlands, Mark.

In: Psyche, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2006, p. 1-10.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rowlands, M 2006, 'Sensorimotor activity', Psyche, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1-10.
Rowlands, Mark. / Sensorimotor activity. In: Psyche. 2006 ; Vol. 12, No. 1. pp. 1-10.
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