Self-awareness and Korsgaard's naturalistic explanation of the good

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This paper explores certain facets of Christine Korsgaard's paper, 'Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good' (2018). Korsgaard's account requires that an animal be able to experience 'herself trying to get or avoid something'. The claim that animals possess such self-awareness is regarded by many as problematic and, if this is correct, it would jeopardize Korsgaard's account. This paper argues that animals can, in fact, be aware of themselves in the way required by Korsgaard's account.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)133-149
Number of pages17
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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