Seeing as a non-experiental mental state

The case from synesthesia and visual imagery

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case of illusory visual experience. This, however, turns out to be a questionable characterization, as there is evidence suggesting that the brain must cognitively process the stimulus in order for the associated synesthetic experience to arise. Furthermore, some very vivid, visual forms of synesthesia do not involve additional processing in the visual cortex. Visual synesthetic experience is likely to be a non-veridical state of seeming rather than an illusory visual experience. Visual seeming states are cognitive states distinct from visual experiences in terms of their representational richness and their neural correlates. Visual seeming states that are non-deviantly causally related to the states of affair they represent constitute a type of non-experiental seeing. Introspective seeming states that are non-deviantly causally related to underlying visual images constitute a second type of non-experiental seeing. The English verb ‘to see’ can denote all three types of seeing, which is to say that ‘to see’ is polysemous.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConsciousness Inside and Out
Subtitle of host publicationPhenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience
PublisherSpringer Netherlands
Pages377-394
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9789400760011
ISBN (Print)9789400760004
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Synaesthesia
Mental State
Visual Imagery
English Verbs
Conscious
Cognitive State
Cortex
Neural Correlates
Stimulus
States of Affairs
Stimulation
Visual Image

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Brogaard, B. (2014). Seeing as a non-experiental mental state: The case from synesthesia and visual imagery. In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience (pp. 377-394). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_26

Seeing as a non-experiental mental state : The case from synesthesia and visual imagery. / Brogaard, Berit.

Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Netherlands, 2014. p. 377-394.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Brogaard, B 2014, Seeing as a non-experiental mental state: The case from synesthesia and visual imagery. in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Netherlands, pp. 377-394. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_26
Brogaard B. Seeing as a non-experiental mental state: The case from synesthesia and visual imagery. In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Netherlands. 2014. p. 377-394 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_26
Brogaard, Berit. / Seeing as a non-experiental mental state : The case from synesthesia and visual imagery. Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Netherlands, 2014. pp. 377-394
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