Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In their epistemological works some medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type examples as objections to the commonly accepted characterization of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and proposed additional epistemic conditions to meet the objections, or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. It is shown that some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology independently of the Gettier Problem or as solutions to it can be regarded as variants of the conditions proposed by medieval authors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationExplaining Knowledge
Subtitle of host publicationNew Essays on the Gettier Problem
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages135-151
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9780198724551
ISBN (Print)9780198724568
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

Fingerprint

Gettier
Gettier Problem
Socrates
Medieval Period
Epistemological
Epistemology
Philosopher

Keywords

  • Epistemology
  • Extendability
  • Forward-looking condition
  • Gettier-type example
  • Medieval philosophy
  • Perfect knowledge
  • Strong sense of knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Hilpinen, R. (2017). Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem (pp. 135-151). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0008

Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. / Hilpinen, Risto.

Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 135-151.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Hilpinen, R 2017, Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press, pp. 135-151. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0008
Hilpinen R. Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press. 2017. p. 135-151 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0008
Hilpinen, Risto. / Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. pp. 135-151
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