Abstract
In their epistemological works some medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type examples as objections to the commonly accepted characterization of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and proposed additional epistemic conditions to meet the objections, or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. It is shown that some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology independently of the Gettier Problem or as solutions to it can be regarded as variants of the conditions proposed by medieval authors.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Explaining Knowledge |
| Subtitle of host publication | New Essays on the Gettier Problem |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 135-151 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198724551 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198724568 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
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Keywords
- Epistemology
- Extendability
- Forward-looking condition
- Gettier-type example
- Medieval philosophy
- Perfect knowledge
- Strong sense of knowledge
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Cite this
Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier. / Hilpinen, Risto.
Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 135-151.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Sed ubi socrates currit? On the gettier problem before gettier
AU - Hilpinen, Risto
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - In their epistemological works some medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type examples as objections to the commonly accepted characterization of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and proposed additional epistemic conditions to meet the objections, or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. It is shown that some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology independently of the Gettier Problem or as solutions to it can be regarded as variants of the conditions proposed by medieval authors.
AB - In their epistemological works some medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type examples as objections to the commonly accepted characterization of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and proposed additional epistemic conditions to meet the objections, or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. It is shown that some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology independently of the Gettier Problem or as solutions to it can be regarded as variants of the conditions proposed by medieval authors.
KW - Epistemology
KW - Extendability
KW - Forward-looking condition
KW - Gettier-type example
KW - Medieval philosophy
KW - Perfect knowledge
KW - Strong sense of knowledge
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049470796&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85049470796&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0008
DO - 10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0008
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85049470796
SN - 9780198724568
SP - 135
EP - 151
BT - Explaining Knowledge
PB - Oxford University Press
ER -