Abstract
Device-to-Device (D2D) computation offloading, or D2D offloading, exploits spare computing resources of nearby user devices to enhance mobile computing performance. Its success relies on user participation in costly collaborative service provisioning, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been studied extensively in the literature, this paper considers a more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks that depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by combining the power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Advances in Information Security |
| Publisher | Springer New York LLC |
| Pages | 85-114 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | Advances in Information Security |
|---|---|
| Volume | 74 |
| ISSN (Print) | 1568-2633 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Information Systems
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. / Xu, Jie; Chen, Lixing.
Advances in Information Security. Springer New York LLC, 2019. p. 85-114 (Advances in Information Security; Vol. 74).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading
AU - Xu, Jie
AU - Chen, Lixing
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - Device-to-Device (D2D) computation offloading, or D2D offloading, exploits spare computing resources of nearby user devices to enhance mobile computing performance. Its success relies on user participation in costly collaborative service provisioning, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been studied extensively in the literature, this paper considers a more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks that depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by combining the power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
AB - Device-to-Device (D2D) computation offloading, or D2D offloading, exploits spare computing resources of nearby user devices to enhance mobile computing performance. Its success relies on user participation in costly collaborative service provisioning, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been studied extensively in the literature, this paper considers a more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks that depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by combining the power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066429704&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85066429704&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-10597-6_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-10597-6_4
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85066429704
T3 - Advances in Information Security
SP - 85
EP - 114
BT - Advances in Information Security
PB - Springer New York LLC
ER -