Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading

Jie Xu, Lixing Chen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Device-to-Device (D2D) computation offloading, or D2D offloading, exploits spare computing resources of nearby user devices to enhance mobile computing performance. Its success relies on user participation in costly collaborative service provisioning, thus mandating an incentive mechanism that can compensate for these costs. Although incentive mechanism design has been studied extensively in the literature, this paper considers a more challenging yet less investigated problem in which selfish users are also facing interdependent security risks that depend on the collective behavior of all users. To this end, we build a novel mathematical framework by combining the power of game theory and epidemic theory to investigate the interplay between user incentives and interdependent security risks in D2D offloading, thereby enabling the design of security-aware incentive mechanisms. Our analysis discovers an interesting “less is more” phenomenon: although giving users more incentives promotes more participation, it may harm the network operator’s utility. This is because too much participation may foster persistent security risks and as a result, the effective participation level does not improve.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Information Security
PublisherSpringer New York LLC
Pages85-114
Number of pages30
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

Publication series

NameAdvances in Information Security
Volume74
ISSN (Print)1568-2633

Fingerprint

Mobile devices
Mobile computing
Game theory
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Xu, J., & Chen, L. (2019). Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. In Advances in Information Security (pp. 85-114). (Advances in Information Security; Vol. 74). Springer New York LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10597-6_4

Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. / Xu, Jie; Chen, Lixing.

Advances in Information Security. Springer New York LLC, 2019. p. 85-114 (Advances in Information Security; Vol. 74).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Xu, J & Chen, L 2019, Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. in Advances in Information Security. Advances in Information Security, vol. 74, Springer New York LLC, pp. 85-114. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10597-6_4
Xu J, Chen L. Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. In Advances in Information Security. Springer New York LLC. 2019. p. 85-114. (Advances in Information Security). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10597-6_4
Xu, Jie ; Chen, Lixing. / Security-Aware Incentives Design for Mobile Device-to-Device Offloading. Advances in Information Security. Springer New York LLC, 2019. pp. 85-114 (Advances in Information Security).
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