Sea battle semantics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later 'become' true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)326-335
Number of pages10
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume58
Issue number231
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2008
Externally publishedYes

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Intuition
Future Contingents
Truth Value
Night
New Paradigm

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Sea battle semantics. / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 231, 04.2008, p. 326-335.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brogaard, Berit. / Sea battle semantics. In: Philosophical Quarterly. 2008 ; Vol. 58, No. 231. pp. 326-335.
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