Screening and preventable illness

Margaret M Byrne, Peter Thompson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

If an agent does not discount the future at a constant rate, as in some forms of myopia, her optimal strategy is unattainable without some commitment device. We apply this familiar idea to a model of screening and disease prevention, and explore how financial incentives can correct suboptimal health choices. In general, myopia need not imply under-screening. While the optimal intervention for prevention effort is a state-invariant subsidy, the optimal intervention for screening may involve a tax or a subsidy. When screening and prevention are coincident, a simple and practical subsidy equal to one minus the discount factor to both screening and intervention is indicated.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1077-1088
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume20
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 9 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Myopia
Motivation
Equipment and Supplies
Health
Screening
Illness
Subsidies

Keywords

  • Financial incentives
  • Medical screening
  • Myopia
  • Time-inconsistency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Screening and preventable illness. / Byrne, Margaret M; Thompson, Peter.

In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 20, No. 6, 09.11.2001, p. 1077-1088.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Byrne, Margaret M ; Thompson, Peter. / Screening and preventable illness. In: Journal of Health Economics. 2001 ; Vol. 20, No. 6. pp. 1077-1088.
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