Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK

Fabrizio Ferri, David A. Maber

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

145 Scopus citations


We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the UK. Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK firms responded to negative say on pay voting outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized as rewards for failure (e.g., generous severance contracts) and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)527-563
Number of pages37
JournalReview of Finance
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 1 2013
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this