Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the "empathic chill" effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in Moral Sentimentalism. I explain why I think his interpretations of my view - both at the Spindel Conference and subsequently - misunderstand the (Kripkean) character of that view. My reply to Lori Watson questions whether her criticisms of Moral Sentimentalism's account of morality are sufficiently sensitive to the self-other asymmetry that typifies so much of ordinary moral thinking.
ASJC Scopus subject areas