Abstract
Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the "empathic chill" effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in Moral Sentimentalism. I explain why I think his interpretations of my view - both at the Spindel Conference and subsequently - misunderstand the (Kripkean) character of that view. My reply to Lori Watson questions whether her criticisms of Moral Sentimentalism's account of morality are sufficiently sensitive to the self-other asymmetry that typifies so much of ordinary moral thinking.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 148-155 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Southern Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | SUPPL. 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2011 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy