Reply to Justin d'Arms and Lori Watson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the "empathic chill" effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in Moral Sentimentalism. I explain why I think his interpretations of my view - both at the Spindel Conference and subsequently - misunderstand the (Kripkean) character of that view. My reply to Lori Watson questions whether her criticisms of Moral Sentimentalism's account of morality are sufficiently sensitive to the self-other asymmetry that typifies so much of ordinary moral thinking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)148-155
Number of pages8
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume49
Issue numberSUPPL. 1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2011

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Sentimentalism
Anger
Disapproval
Chill
Empathy
Morality
Theory of Reference
Criticism
Asymmetry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Reply to Justin d'Arms and Lori Watson. / Slote, Michael.

In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 49, No. SUPPL. 1, 09.2011, p. 148-155.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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