Remarks on counterpossibles

Berit Brogaard, Joe Salerno

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

45 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Since the publication of David Lewis' Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form 'If p were the case, q would be the case' is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis' semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325-527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261-310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237-302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)639-660
Number of pages22
JournalSynthese
Volume190
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

semantics
formal logic
priest
logic
Impossible Worlds
Justification
Subjunctive Conditionals
Semantic Similarity
Formal Logic
Impossibility
Priests
David Lewis
Classical Logic

Keywords

  • Accessibility relation
  • Contingent counterpossibles
  • Counterfactuals
  • Essential properties
  • Impossible worlds
  • Indicative conditionals
  • Lewis semantics
  • Limit assumption
  • Non-trivial counterpossibles
  • Subjunctive conditionals

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Philosophy

Cite this

Remarks on counterpossibles. / Brogaard, Berit; Salerno, Joe.

In: Synthese, Vol. 190, No. 4, 2013, p. 639-660.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brogaard, Berit ; Salerno, Joe. / Remarks on counterpossibles. In: Synthese. 2013 ; Vol. 190, No. 4. pp. 639-660.
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