Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages225-236
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9781351362917
ISBN (Print)9781138888852
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Stance
Voluntarism
Realism
Anti-realism
Immunity
Refutation
Scientific Realist

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Chakravartty, A. (2017). Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism (pp. 225-236). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203712498

Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. / Chakravartty, Anjan.

The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Taylor and Francis, 2017. p. 225-236.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Chakravartty, A 2017, Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. in The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 225-236. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203712498
Chakravartty A. Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Taylor and Francis. 2017. p. 225-236 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203712498
Chakravartty, Anjan. / Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Taylor and Francis, 2017. pp. 225-236
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