Abstract
Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism |
| Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
| Pages | 225-236 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351362917 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781138888852 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
Cite this
Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism. / Chakravartty, Anjan.
The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. Taylor and Francis, 2017. p. 225-236.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Realism, antirealism, epistemic stances, and voluntarism
AU - Chakravartty, Anjan
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.
AB - Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.
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U2 - 10.4324/9780203712498
DO - 10.4324/9780203712498
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9781138888852
SP - 225
EP - 236
BT - The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism
PB - Taylor and Francis
ER -