Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism|
|Publisher||Taylor and Francis|
|Number of pages||12|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2017|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)