Abstract
Debates between different kinds of scientific realists and antirealists are longstanding and show every sign of continuing. In this chapter I examine one explanation of their longevity: lurking beneath various forms of realism and antirealism are conflicting commitments which (1) sustain these positions and (2) are immune to refutation. These deeper commitments are to different epistemic stances. I consider the nature of philosophical stances generally and, more specifically, of epistemic stances in relation to the sciences. I investigate the question of how stances are evaluated and adopted, and elaborate on the most telling reason for their immunity, namely a form of voluntarism regarding their adoption.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 225-236 |
Number of pages | 12 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351362917 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138888852 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)