Abstract
Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the "classical model" of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the "judgment model" they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 597-613 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Metaphilosophy |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| State | Published - 2004 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Judgment
- Rationality
- Reasons
- Rules
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
Rationality and judgment. / Siegel, Harvey.
In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2004, p. 597-613.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Rationality and judgment
AU - Siegel, Harvey
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the "classical model" of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the "judgment model" they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.
AB - Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the "classical model" of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the "judgment model" they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.
KW - Judgment
KW - Rationality
KW - Reasons
KW - Rules
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=35148820735&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=35148820735&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:35148820735
VL - 35
SP - 597
EP - 613
JO - Metaphilosophy
JF - Metaphilosophy
SN - 0026-1068
IS - 5
ER -