Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

Otavio Bueno, Newton C A Da Costa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it's perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it's not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)383-399
Number of pages17
JournalSynthese
Volume154
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2007

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rationality
science
scientific revolution
lack
Paraconsistency
Scientific Rationalism
Theory Change
Rationality
Mathematicians
Foundationalist
Scientific Change
Logic
Scientific Theory
Coherentist
Scientific Revolution
Plague

Keywords

  • Coherence
  • Inconsistency
  • Paraconsistent logic
  • Rationality
  • Scientific change

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science. / Bueno, Otavio; Da Costa, Newton C A.

In: Synthese, Vol. 154, No. 3, 02.2007, p. 383-399.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bueno, Otavio ; Da Costa, Newton C A. / Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science. In: Synthese. 2007 ; Vol. 154, No. 3. pp. 383-399.
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