Public offers in the market for lemons with large discounting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller's discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)63-65
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume130
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bargaining with interdependent values
  • Public offers
  • The market for lemons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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