Abstract
Recent philosophy has paid increasing attention to the nature of the relationship between the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Steven French offers many insights into this relationship (primarily) in the context of fundamental physics, and claims that a specific, structuralist conception of the ontology of the world exemplifies an optimal understanding of it. In this paper I contend that his messages regarding how best to think about the relationship are mixed, and in tension with one another. The tension is resolvable but at a cost: a weakening of the argument for French's structuralist ontology. I elaborate this claim in a specific case: his assertion of the superiority of a structuralist account of de re modality in terms of realism about laws and symmetries (conceived ontologically) over an account in terms of realism about dispositional properties. I suggest that these two accounts stem from different stances regarding how to theorize about scientific ontology, each of which is motivated by important aspects of physics.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 10-15 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
| Volume | 74 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 1 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Dispositions
- Explanation
- Metaphysics of science
- Naturalized metaphysics
- Structural realism
- Symmetries
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- History and Philosophy of Science
Cite this
Physics, metaphysics, dispositions, and symmetries – À la French. / Chakravartty, Anjan.
In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Vol. 74, 01.04.2019, p. 10-15.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Physics, metaphysics, dispositions, and symmetries – À la French
AU - Chakravartty, Anjan
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - Recent philosophy has paid increasing attention to the nature of the relationship between the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Steven French offers many insights into this relationship (primarily) in the context of fundamental physics, and claims that a specific, structuralist conception of the ontology of the world exemplifies an optimal understanding of it. In this paper I contend that his messages regarding how best to think about the relationship are mixed, and in tension with one another. The tension is resolvable but at a cost: a weakening of the argument for French's structuralist ontology. I elaborate this claim in a specific case: his assertion of the superiority of a structuralist account of de re modality in terms of realism about laws and symmetries (conceived ontologically) over an account in terms of realism about dispositional properties. I suggest that these two accounts stem from different stances regarding how to theorize about scientific ontology, each of which is motivated by important aspects of physics.
AB - Recent philosophy has paid increasing attention to the nature of the relationship between the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Steven French offers many insights into this relationship (primarily) in the context of fundamental physics, and claims that a specific, structuralist conception of the ontology of the world exemplifies an optimal understanding of it. In this paper I contend that his messages regarding how best to think about the relationship are mixed, and in tension with one another. The tension is resolvable but at a cost: a weakening of the argument for French's structuralist ontology. I elaborate this claim in a specific case: his assertion of the superiority of a structuralist account of de re modality in terms of realism about laws and symmetries (conceived ontologically) over an account in terms of realism about dispositional properties. I suggest that these two accounts stem from different stances regarding how to theorize about scientific ontology, each of which is motivated by important aspects of physics.
KW - Dispositions
KW - Explanation
KW - Metaphysics of science
KW - Naturalized metaphysics
KW - Structural realism
KW - Symmetries
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85059616545&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85059616545&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.006
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.006
M3 - Article
C2 - 31030800
AN - SCOPUS:85059616545
VL - 74
SP - 10
EP - 15
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
SN - 0039-3681
ER -