Abstract
Recent philosophy has paid increasing attention to the nature of the relationship between the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Steven French offers many insights into this relationship (primarily) in the context of fundamental physics, and claims that a specific, structuralist conception of the ontology of the world exemplifies an optimal understanding of it. In this paper I contend that his messages regarding how best to think about the relationship are mixed, and in tension with one another. The tension is resolvable but at a cost: a weakening of the argument for French's structuralist ontology. I elaborate this claim in a specific case: his assertion of the superiority of a structuralist account of de re modality in terms of realism about laws and symmetries (conceived ontologically) over an account in terms of realism about dispositional properties. I suggest that these two accounts stem from different stances regarding how to theorize about scientific ontology, each of which is motivated by important aspects of physics.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 10-15 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |
Volume | 74 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 1 2019 |
Keywords
- Dispositions
- Explanation
- Metaphysics of science
- Naturalized metaphysics
- Structural realism
- Symmetries
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- History and Philosophy of Science