Personhood and future belief: Two arguments for something like Reflection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people's beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one's future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)91-110
Number of pages20
JournalErkenntnis
Volume67
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2007

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Person
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Transcendental
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Keywords

  • Belief
  • Epistemology
  • Personhood
  • Plans
  • Reflection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Cite this

Personhood and future belief : Two arguments for something like Reflection. / Evnine, Simon.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 67, No. 1, 07.2007, p. 91-110.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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