TY - JOUR
T1 - Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrapping
AU - Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena
PY - 2015/11/11
Y1 - 2015/11/11
N2 - According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational reasoning process. On the most plausible versions of Perceptual Fundamentalism, a priori bootstrapping cannot be used to rationally support anti-sceptical beliefs about the reliability of perception. Moreover, seeing why Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping will help us to better understand the nature of the perceptual entitlements that Perceptual Fundamentalists posit, or at least should posit.
AB - According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational reasoning process. On the most plausible versions of Perceptual Fundamentalism, a priori bootstrapping cannot be used to rationally support anti-sceptical beliefs about the reliability of perception. Moreover, seeing why Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping will help us to better understand the nature of the perceptual entitlements that Perceptual Fundamentalists posit, or at least should posit.
KW - A priori bootstrapping
KW - Dogmatism
KW - Narrow-scope reasons
KW - Perceptual justification
KW - Phenomenal conservatism
KW - Ralph Wegdwood
KW - Stewart Cohen
KW - Suppositional reasoning
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U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0598-7
DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0598-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84946761385
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
SN - 0031-8116
ER -