Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrapping

Magdalena Balcerak Jackson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational reasoning process. On the most plausible versions of Perceptual Fundamentalism, a priori bootstrapping cannot be used to rationally support anti-sceptical beliefs about the reliability of perception. Moreover, seeing why Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping will help us to better understand the nature of the perceptual entitlements that Perceptual Fundamentalists posit, or at least should posit.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalPhilosophical Studies
StateAccepted/In press - Nov 11 2015


  • A priori bootstrapping
  • Dogmatism
  • Narrow-scope reasons
  • Perceptual justification
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Ralph Wegdwood
  • Stewart Cohen
  • Suppositional reasoning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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