Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception

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1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain relational view of experience but entails a rejection of representationalism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalTopoi
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Mar 15 2015

Keywords

  • Cognitive penetration
  • Naïve realism
  • Perceptual experience
  • Perceptual seemings
  • Representationalism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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