Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception

Berit Brogaard

doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9312-9

Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception

Berit Brogaard

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain relational view of experience but entails a rejection of representationalism.

Original language	English (US)
Journal	Topoi
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9312-9
State	Accepted/In press - Mar 15 2015

Keywords

Cognitive penetration
Naïve realism
Perceptual experience
Perceptual seemings
Representationalism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11245-015-9312-9

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AB - In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain relational view of experience but entails a rejection of representationalism.

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KW - Naïve realism

KW - Perceptual experience

KW - Perceptual seemings

KW - Representationalism

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Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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