Abstract
In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain relational view of experience but entails a rejection of representationalism.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Journal | Topoi |
DOIs | |
State | Accepted/In press - Mar 15 2015 |
Keywords
- Cognitive penetration
- Naïve realism
- Perceptual experience
- Perceptual seemings
- Representationalism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy