On properly characterizing moral agency

Blaine Fowers, Austen R. Anderson, Samantha F. Lang

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract

Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)e43
JournalThe Behavioral and brain sciences
Volume41
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Individuality
Psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

Cite this

On properly characterizing moral agency. / Fowers, Blaine; Anderson, Austen R.; Lang, Samantha F.

In: The Behavioral and brain sciences, Vol. 41, 01.01.2018, p. e43.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Fowers, Blaine ; Anderson, Austen R. ; Lang, Samantha F. / On properly characterizing moral agency. In: The Behavioral and brain sciences. 2018 ; Vol. 41. pp. e43.
@article{72e710bf477f40859f7c3a323130c345,
title = "On properly characterizing moral agency",
abstract = "Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.",
author = "Blaine Fowers and Anderson, {Austen R.} and Lang, {Samantha F.}",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0140525X1700067X",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "41",
pages = "e43",
journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
issn = "0140-525X",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On properly characterizing moral agency

AU - Fowers, Blaine

AU - Anderson, Austen R.

AU - Lang, Samantha F.

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

AB - Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065783171&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85065783171&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X1700067X

DO - 10.1017/S0140525X1700067X

M3 - Comment/debate

C2 - 31064431

AN - SCOPUS:85065783171

VL - 41

SP - e43

JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

SN - 0140-525X

ER -