On properly characterizing moral agency

Blaine Fowers, Austen R. Anderson, Samantha F. Lang

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract

Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)e43
JournalThe Behavioral and brain sciences
Volume41
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience

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