Abstract
A meaningful life, we shall argue, is a life upon which a certain sort of valuable pattern has been imposed by the person in question—a pattern which involves in serious ways the person having an effect upon the world. Meaningfulness is thus a special kind of value which a human life can bear. Two interrelated difficulties face ths proposal. One concerns responsiblity: how are we to account for the fact that a life that satisfies the above criteria can have more meaning than a life with the same positive outcomes but which lacks responsiblity on the part of the agent? The other turns on these outcomes themselves: how can the meaningfulness engendered by actions you perform now be affected by what those actions go on to produce in the future, perhaps even after your death? We provide a response to both of these difficulties.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 443-458 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Philosophical Papers |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
On luck, Responsibility and the meaning of life. / Brogaard, Berit; Smith, Barry.
In: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2005, p. 443-458.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - On luck, Responsibility and the meaning of life
AU - Brogaard, Berit
AU - Smith, Barry
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - A meaningful life, we shall argue, is a life upon which a certain sort of valuable pattern has been imposed by the person in question—a pattern which involves in serious ways the person having an effect upon the world. Meaningfulness is thus a special kind of value which a human life can bear. Two interrelated difficulties face ths proposal. One concerns responsiblity: how are we to account for the fact that a life that satisfies the above criteria can have more meaning than a life with the same positive outcomes but which lacks responsiblity on the part of the agent? The other turns on these outcomes themselves: how can the meaningfulness engendered by actions you perform now be affected by what those actions go on to produce in the future, perhaps even after your death? We provide a response to both of these difficulties.
AB - A meaningful life, we shall argue, is a life upon which a certain sort of valuable pattern has been imposed by the person in question—a pattern which involves in serious ways the person having an effect upon the world. Meaningfulness is thus a special kind of value which a human life can bear. Two interrelated difficulties face ths proposal. One concerns responsiblity: how are we to account for the fact that a life that satisfies the above criteria can have more meaning than a life with the same positive outcomes but which lacks responsiblity on the part of the agent? The other turns on these outcomes themselves: how can the meaningfulness engendered by actions you perform now be affected by what those actions go on to produce in the future, perhaps even after your death? We provide a response to both of these difficulties.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85016681614&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/05568640509485167
DO - 10.1080/05568640509485167
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85016681614
VL - 34
SP - 443
EP - 458
JO - Philosophical Papers
JF - Philosophical Papers
SN - 0556-8641
IS - 3
ER -