Non-visual consciousness and visual images in blindsight

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent response paper to . Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argument while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually conscious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify largely is an empirical question. I conclude by sketching a method for testing whether blindsight subjects have visual consciousness of stimuli presented to them in their blind field.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)595-596
Number of pages2
JournalConsciousness and Cognition
Volume21
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Consciousness
Stimulus
Conscious
Visual Image
Visual Stimuli
Conscious Experience
Testing

Keywords

  • Blindsight
  • Consciousness
  • Introspection
  • PAS
  • Sense modality
  • Subjective reports
  • Visual perception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology

Cite this

Non-visual consciousness and visual images in blindsight. / Brogaard, Berit.

In: Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 21, No. 1, 03.2012, p. 595-596.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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