Nominalism and mathematical intuition

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPhilosophy of Mathematics
Subtitle of host publicationSet Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism
Publisherde Gruyter
Pages93-111
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9783110323689
ISBN (Print)3937202528, 9783110323092
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

Fingerprint

Nominalism
Mathematical Intuition
Intuition
Mathematics
Nominalist
Epistemology
Salient
Platonist

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Bueno, O. (2013). Nominalism and mathematical intuition. In Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism (pp. 93-111). de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93

Nominalism and mathematical intuition. / Bueno, Otavio.

Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism. de Gruyter, 2013. p. 93-111.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Bueno, O 2013, Nominalism and mathematical intuition. in Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism. de Gruyter, pp. 93-111. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93
Bueno O. Nominalism and mathematical intuition. In Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism. de Gruyter. 2013. p. 93-111 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93
Bueno, Otavio. / Nominalism and mathematical intuition. Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism. de Gruyter, 2013. pp. 93-111
@inbook{bf57ea8b7d2b4fcc868c1a7d44f7c672,
title = "Nominalism and mathematical intuition",
abstract = "As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.",
author = "Otavio Bueno",
year = "2013",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1515/9783110323689.93",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "3937202528",
pages = "93--111",
booktitle = "Philosophy of Mathematics",
publisher = "de Gruyter",
address = "Germany",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Nominalism and mathematical intuition

AU - Bueno, Otavio

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

AB - As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064804483&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85064804483&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1515/9783110323689.93

DO - 10.1515/9783110323689.93

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85064804483

SN - 3937202528

SN - 9783110323092

SP - 93

EP - 111

BT - Philosophy of Mathematics

PB - de Gruyter

ER -