Nominalism and mathematical intuition

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPhilosophy of Mathematics
Subtitle of host publicationSet Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism
Publisherde Gruyter
Pages93-111
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9783110323689
ISBN (Print)3937202528, 9783110323092
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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  • Cite this

    Bueno, O. (2013). Nominalism and mathematical intuition. In Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism (pp. 93-111). de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93