### Abstract

As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Title of host publication | Philosophy of Mathematics |

Subtitle of host publication | Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism |

Publisher | de Gruyter |

Pages | 93-111 |

Number of pages | 19 |

ISBN (Electronic) | 9783110323689 |

ISBN (Print) | 3937202528, 9783110323092 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jan 1 2013 |

### Fingerprint

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Arts and Humanities(all)

### Cite this

*Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism*(pp. 93-111). de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93

**Nominalism and mathematical intuition.** / Bueno, Otavio.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

*Philosophy of Mathematics: Set Theory, Measuring Theories, and Nominalism.*de Gruyter, pp. 93-111. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323689.93

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Nominalism and mathematical intuition

AU - Bueno, Otavio

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

AB - As part of the development of an epistemology for mathematics, some Platonists have defended the view that we have (i) intuition that certain mathematical principles hold, and (ii) intuition of the properties of some mathematical objects. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties that this view faces to accommodate some salient features of mathematical practice. I then offer an alternative, agnostic nominalist proposal in which, despite the role played by mathematical intuition, these difficulties do not emerge.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064804483&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85064804483&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1515/9783110323689.93

DO - 10.1515/9783110323689.93

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85064804483

SN - 3937202528

SN - 9783110323092

SP - 93

EP - 111

BT - Philosophy of Mathematics

PB - de Gruyter

ER -